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Abstract The Tohoku region, Northeast Japan, was hit by a gigantic earthquake which
occurred in the Pacific close to Tohoku, and subsequently by a giant tsunami. These
hazards have caused huge damage on the eastern coast Japan. The earthquake’s magnitude
was 9.0, the strongest ever recorded in Japan. The tsunami was also historical as its run-up
height reached over 39 m. As of early May, 2011, over 24 thousand people were reported as
dead or missing. Moreover, serious accidents at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plants No.1
were caused by the effects of the tsunami. Therefore, the damage faced by Japanese people
can be seen as a giant composite disaster. Although Japan, and the northeast of Japan in
particular, has over a long time period increased its preparedness against earthquakes
and tsunamis, huge damage still occurred. This paper considers why this tragedy
occurred, and what unrecognized factors contributed to the high vulnerability of the
area. To assist in answering such questions, this paper presents a timely report of the
features of the earthquake and tsunami, the damage they caused, and the early efforts
for recovery and reconstruction.
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1 Introduction
At 2:46PM Japan Standard Time (JST) on 11th March, 2011, a gigantic earthquake
occurred in the Pacific, just off the coast of Tohoku, Japan. The combined earthquake and
resulting giant tsunami caused huge damage in eastern Japan. The earthquake’s magnitude
was 9.0, the maximum ever recorded in Japan. The tsunami was also historical in terms of
its height and area affected. Its run-up height reached over 39 m. As of early May, 2011,
over 24 thousand people were reported as dead or missing. The number of temporary
refugees exceeded 350 thousand at one time. Moreover, serious accidents at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) No.1 of Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) were caused by
the tsunami. Figure 1 shows the locations of prefectures and places damaged heavily in the
east Japan, which will be referred in this paper.
Japan has been long and repeatedly suffered from earthquakes and tsunamis. As 70% of
its national land is occupied by mountainous areas, population, assets, industrial activities
and infrastructure are concentrated in the narrow low-lying coastal areas. Japan has
also made a long effort to prevent damage from natural hazards such as earthquakes
and tsunamis. Significantly, the Tohoku coast which was heavily damaged by the
March 11 event had developed the most advanced anti-earthquake/tsunami system in
the world. So why did this tragedy happen? What factors contributed to the high
vulnerability of the area?
Fig. 1 Damaged prefectures and cities in the east Japan
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We are concerned that it is too early to present a report as so many refugees still remain
in evacuation centers and we have only an incomplete picture of the disaster. However, Dr
Robert Dixon, Editor of Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, invited us
to prepare a paper as many people in the world wait for information from Japan. To respond
to his request, we wrote this paper, as an interim report from university researchers in the
affected area. As academic results are still limited, we used reports released by the
government, research institutes and mass media as a basis of this paper.
The Japan Meteological Agency (JMA) named the earthquake as the “2011 off the
Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake”. On the other hand, the government refers to the
complex disaster as the “Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami”. We follow the latter in
this paper.
2 Characteristics and damaged of the earthquake
2.1 Characteristics of the earthquake motion
The epicenter of the Great East Japan Earthquake was at 38 N and 142.9E, as indicated in
Fig. 2 The depth was estimated to be 24 km. This earthquake is considered to be a plate-
boundary thrust-faulting in subduction area with a reverse fault. The Headquarters for
Earthquake Research Promotion (2011), the Ministry of Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science & Technology, reported that the fault area stretched 400 km and 200 km in
the NS and EW directions, respectively. In this area, at least three large earthquakes
occurred consecutively, with the maximum slide distance of the crust amounting to 24 m.
Immediately after the earthquake the magnitude was reported as M8.8, but it was later
corrected to M9.0. These parameters prove that the earthquake was unprecedented in Japan.
The prefectures nearest to the epicenter (Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima) were the worst
affected as well.
To classify the ground motion, JMA uses the Japan’s intensity of ground motion, with 0
to 7 classes. The highest class 7 of was recorded in Kurihara-city, Miyagi prefecture.
Figure 3 shows that strong ground motion (ranking 6 to 7 and shown in dark colors)
occurred in a wide coastal area of the east Japan.
By comparing the past strong earthquakes, we can identify the characteristics of the
Great East Japan Earthquake as follows:
i) The earthquake was the biggest measured earthquake in Japan. Maximum recorded
acceleration of the ground motion reached 3000 gal (30 m/s2) in Kurihara-city, Miyagi
prefecture. In addition, shaking lasted for nearly 6 min, which reflected the consecutive
breaks of the faults over a wide area. Based on such observations, the earthquake is
considered to be a 1/1000 year event.
ii) Many large aftershocks followed the main event (Fig. 2). The number of those larger than
M5 is over 420 as of 19th April. One of the largest, with M7.1, occurred on 7th April.
Moreover, the JMA suggested that an earthquake which took place on 9th March might
be a foreshock. These indicate that the phenomena were a series of large scale crustal
motions which will last for a considerable period of time, with ongoing consequences.
iii) The dominant period of the main earthquake was 0.2 to 1.0 s. This range is shorter
than that of the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake. This is a possible reason why the
damage of buildings was less intensive compared to the previous case in Kobe.
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iv) Accidents of Fukushima NPP No.1 were induced. This makes the disaster much more
serious to society, and the recovery pathways very complicated.
2.2 Damage from the earthquake
The earthquake resulted in huge damage. The Disaster Countermeasures Office (2011a),
Office of Prime Minister, reported the following data on the damage as of 27th April.
i) Human casualties include 14,508 dead and 11,452 missing people. Since many areas
are still left uninvestigated, the number is expected to increase.
ii) The number of completely collapsed and washed-out houses amounts to 76,000, and the
number of those with half and partial damage is over 244,000. Following the earthquake,
345 fires occurred in 12 prefectures, including cases where the tsunami triggered the fire.
iii) Infrastructure damage was also very wide spread; reported damaged included 3,546
areas along roads, 71 bridges and 26 parts of the railway system. Such damage has
strong effects on the recovery as well as on economic activities in general. On the

















Fig. 2 Distribution of epicenters of the main earthquake and aftershocks (Revised from Japan Meteological
Agency 2011a)
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in operation, including Tohoku Shin-Kansen, were able to make emergency stops
safely, without any deaths or serious injuries.
iv) Lifeline infrastructure such as electricity, water supply, sewage systems, and gas lines,
was also damaged. Though such services were soon restored in most of the damaged
areas, the coastal areas most heavily damaged in the northeast Japan are still without
these services at the time of writing.
v) The damage costs will be between 16 and 25 trillion yen.
According to the Geographical Survey Institute (2011), the main earthquake which
occurred on the 11th March was associated with large movement of the crustal plate; i.e.
about 4.0 to 5.0 m horizontal offshore movement and 0.4 to over 1.0 m subsidence. On
land, large movements were also observed. The largest movement was at the Ojika
Peninsula, Miyagi Prefecture, where 5.4 m (horizontal) and 1.20 m (vertical) movements of
the ground were observed.
Intensity    4   5 5+  6 6+  7 
 
Earthquake  14:46, 11March   
Observed  15:01, 11 March  
Fig. 3 Distribution of Japan’s intensity of ground motion (Revised from Japan Meteological Agency 2011b)
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As a result of such motions, many impacts occurred on artificially reclaimed lands,
soft alluvial plains, and fragile slopes. These are common land features in Japan. Land
slides also created strong damage, because the sediment mass has large weight, and
hence apply stronger impulse forces to buildings and other features. For example, in
Sukagawa-city, Fukushima Prefecture, a 18.1 m high earth dam was broken, causing
eight deaths and missing people (Fig. 4). Another landslide and debris flow occurred in
Shirakawa-city and Nasukarasuyama-city killing 13 people, and with two people still
missing.
Building damage is closely related to the frequency responses. The frequency of the
ground motion is higher than that of 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, as shown in Fig. 5. This
results in smaller effects on the structure of buildings. Therefore, the destroyed houses and
buildings in the coastal areas were mainly due to the tsunami. However, in Ibaraki
Prefecture, at the southern end of the damaged region, there were completely or half
collapsed houses in inland areas. They were not damaged by the tsunami, but by the
earthquake and resulting foundation failure.
Breakdown of lifelines continued for several weeks in many places. Figure 6 shows
the recovery of water supply in Fukushima Prefecture as of 28th March. Much longer time
is needed in the areas with tsunami damage and soft foundations. Damage to roads,
railways and lifelines first resulted in insufficient supplies of food and gasoline to the
impacted areas. Secondary effects then resulted, including on the physical and
psychological conditions of refugees. These also became big problems for rescue
activities.
The largest consequence of the earthquake and tsunami is the accident at the
Fukushima NPP No1. Many serious problems have resulted, including nuclear
contamination of soils and sea water, and evacuation of a large number of residents in
Fig. 4 Burst dam (Fujinuma reservoir)
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the surrounding areas, initially 20 km and then subsequently more distant from the NPP.
This event revealed problems associated with risk management, and information
disclosure as well. When the physical impacts of the earthquake and tsunami were
combined with health, psychological, and social problems caused by the Fukushima
NPP accident, the situation became very serious and complicated. The causes of the
nuclear accident and the present situation at the NPP will be discussed later in this
paper.
Alluvial plain
Alluvial plain map, Fukushima
Fig. 6 Aqueduct damage map, Fukushima prefecture
Fig. 5 Frequency characteristics
of velocity response spectrum
(Revised from Earthquake
Research Institute (2011))
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3 Characteristics of the tsunami and its damages
According to the tsunami-related information released by Japan Weather Association
(2011), very soon after the major earthquake occurred at 2:46PM JST the first wave arrived
at cities near to the failure fault, such as Miyako, Ofunato, and Kamaishi in Iwate
Prefecture. The highest wave arrived at these locations between 3:15 and 3:20PM. This
means that the highest waves reached the nearest coastlines 30 to 40 min after the
earthquake occurred. The first waves arrived at more distant coasts, from Hokkaido in the
north to Chiba Prefecture in the south, considerably later.
Very large wave heights occurred along southern Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi and northern
Fukushima Prefectures. Wave heights and run-up elevations of tsunami are not the same;
wave height is the distance between the mean sea level and the crest of the tsunami wave in
the sea, while run-up elevation refers to the maximum height of the land where the tsunami
reaches. Many tidal stations recorded high water levels of around 8 m in these areas, before
they were destroyed by the tsunami, and no data were recorded. One exception is Onagawa
NPP of Tohoku Electric Power Co. It recorded temporal variations of sea surface elevation
at the coast, as shown in Fig. 7. This is a precious record obtained at a central position in
the severely damaged region. This record shows that a large wave of nearly 13 m high
arrived just before 3:30PM, with lowest values occurring around 15:45. More data are
expected to be published from sensors in the deep sea floor.
Ria coasts dominate in the damaged area in Iwate Prefecture. The coasts consist of many
bays and rocky cliffs. People concentrate in narrow flat plains along the bays, to form cities
such as Rikuzen-Takata and Miyako, and fishery and/or commercial ports such as Kamaishi
and Ofunato. These names of these cities will be used when describing more local damage.
The tsunami hit these bays with a wave height of over 10 m, the height being higher due to
the amplification effect of the horn aperture of the bays. Table 1 indicates a summary of the
strength of the tsunami and inundation, and the resulting human casualties for several cities
in this area. For example, in Rikuzen-Takata-city, the wave height was over 15 m, with the
highest run-up elevation being about 39 m. Furthermore, tsunami waves extended up along
a river and flooded over river dikes in themiddle and upper reaches. There are some areas which
were hit by both tsunamis approaching from the coast and rivers, in a pincer attack. As these
places are several kilometers inland from the coast, people did not expect that such flooding
would occur. The overwhelming force of tsunami inundated 43% of the residential areas, and













Time on 11 March
Fig. 7 Tsunami wave profile observed at Onagawa coast, Miyagi Prefecture. Note: O.P. is the datum at
Onahama Port, Fukushima Prefecture. (Revised from Tohoku Electric Power Co. (2011))
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The 100 km stretch south of the Ria coasts has sandy coasts, stretching from Miyagi
Prefecture to northern part of Fukushima Prefecture. The coastal plain is called Sendai
Plain, as Sendai-City, the largest city in Tohoku Region, is situated inland on this plain. A
wave height of 7 m was observed at Souma, the southern tip of this coast. The elevation of
the plain is less than 5 m, and high tsunami waves penetrated deep into it. The maximum
penetration distance was about 6 km. Flooding on such a wide area, and the resulting
damages, are unprecedented.
Ibaraki and Chiba Prefectures are south of Fukushima Prefecture. Tsunamis of 3.3 m to
7.2 m high (Ibaraki) and 1.3 m to 7.6 m high (Chiba) were observed. Consequently, the
tsunami associated with the Great East Japan Earthquake attached a long coastline of over
800 km in the northeast Japan, representing a major external force that imposed devastating
damages on the coastal areas.
4 Some aspects of the tsunami damage
4.1 Effects of coastal dykes and breakwaters
The Pacific coast of northeast Japan is called Sanriku Region. This region has suffered from
large tsunamis in the past: it experienced enormous damage in 1886 (Meiji Snriku
Tsunami), 1933 (Showa Sanriku Tsunami), 1960 (Chilean Earthquake Tsunami) and 1968
(Off Tokachi Tsunami). Based on these disasters, the national and local governments
continued to increase the level of the tsunami countermeasures. As one of such measures,
large breakwaters were constructed at the mouths of Ofunato, Kamaishi, Miyako, and Kuji
bays, to protect the cities located in the inner bay areas against tsunamis.
Among the tsunami protection facilities, giant bay-mouth breakwaters were noteworthy.
For example, Kamaishi Bay has a breakwater consisting of north and south parts of 990 m
and 670 m length, respectively, and a total length of 2 km. Its maximum depth below water
is 63 m, while the height above mean sea level is 8 m. Its design criterion was to protect the
city and port of Kamaishi against the Meiji Sanriku Tsunami, which was caused by a M8.5
earthquake in 1896. About 6,700 people were killed and 1,600 houses were washed away
by the tsunami. Therefore, constructing this breakwater has long been desired by the local
people. This breakwater was completed in 2009, using 700 million m3 of concrete. This
breakwater is registered in the Guinness Book of World Records as the deepest breakwater
in the world. It played a role to protect the city against tsunamis, until March 11. Ofunato
Table 1 Examples for height and areas of inundation due to the tsunami, and the resulting damage













Rate of dead and
missing people
(%)
Rikuzen-Takata 15.8 13 5.6 43 2,422 10.4
Kamaishi 9.3 7 1.6 22 1,310 3.3
Otsuchi 12.6 4 2.0 52 1,631 10.7
Ishiniomaki 15.5 73 13.1 46 5,538 3.5
Onagawa 14.8 3 4.5 48 1,504 15.0
Minamisanriku 15.9 10 6.1 52 1,095 6.3
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also has a big bay-mouth breakwater with a total length of 550 m and a depth of 40 m. Though
water pollution in the bay became worse after the breakwater was constructed, residents
considered the tsunami protection to be more important relative to any adverse consequences.
Taro district, in Miyako City, was surrounded by high coastal dykes called “Great
Walls”. They were 10 m high and 10 km in total length (Fig. 8). Taro experienced a tragedy
after being hit by a 10 m tsunami which killed over 900 people in 1933. They started to
build the coastal dykes the following year. In 1958 a 10 m dyke system with a length of
1.4 km was completed. It worked very well in the occasion of the Chilean Tsunami in 1960,
with no casualties. In 1979 the dyke system was partially upgraded to a great wall with a
two-track structure. After that it continued to be effective.
The recent Great East Japan Tsunami flew over these structures, attacking cities and
causing huge casualties. The bay-mouth breakwaters were destroyed in Kamaishi and
Ofunato. The great coastal dykes in Taro could not prevent overflows and were destroyed
as well. Some people claimed that the structures had no effect, and that disaster prevention
education should be more effective. However, evidence from videos, photos and witnesses
confirms that the coastal structures reduced the damage to some extent. Thus the role of
coastal structures remains a controversial issue. However, it is true that the structures played
a preventive role against past tsunamis which had heights lower than their design heights.
Therefore, the role and effectiveness of structures when the tsunami is higher than the
design criterion is a matter for further study.
4.2 Education for disaster prevention
People of cities in northeast Japan, such as Kesennuma and Kamaishi, are enthusiastic
about tsunami disaster prevention. They have been very effective in this regard, by
Fig. 8 Ten meter high coastal dykes in Taro, Miyako City (Before the tsunami; Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism)
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organizing workshops, education for tsunami disasters and evacuation practices over the
past 20 years. In particular, after the construction of the breakwaters, they also strengthened
soft measures such as distribution of tsunami hazard maps to all households. Each city/town
government prepared a tsunami hazard map, which overlays the estimated inundation areas of
tsunamis and river floods, as well as risk areas for slope failures, based on scientific estimates.
Moreover, they also promoted soft measures in local workshops for disaster prevention, such as
discussions and practices to find evacuation places and routes. Loud speakers and radio
transmissions were installed in each city or town to announce emergency cautions.
These prevention activities had a great effect, even in face of the gigantic tsunami. Special
note should be mentioned about the fact that nearly 3,000 children in elementary and middle-
high schools managed to evacuate safely in Kamaishi. There is a legend of “Tsunami
tendenko”. As “tendenko”means “scattered” in local language, the legend has been transferred
for a long time to teach that, when you feel an earthquake, you should not wait for a unified
action but run away individually and immediately. After the Great East Japan Earthquake, most
elementary and middle-high schools evacuated students to higher places. Importantly, this
action was taken before local authorities issued evacuation alerts. On the other hand, some
people regretted that they relied too much on hard structures such as coastal dykes, based on the
fact as they thought that these structures had successfully protected against tsunamis until then.
There was an instance where raised awareness was of no assistance. In Otsuchi, officers
of the town government evacuated from the town hall after the earthquake. The tsunami
attacked them shortly after they established a disaster countermeasure office outside of the
town hall. Eleven officers, including the town mayor, were killed or missing, out of 14 staff
in Otsuchi (Fig. 9). They thought that they were responsible to lead people’s evacuation
rather than their own evacuation. They also tried to achieve allocated emergency roles such
as shut-down of water gates and preparation of evacuation centers. Their roles conflicted
with their own “evacuation first”.
Fig. 9 Damages in Otsuchi (Photo: So Kazama, 5th April)
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4.3 Aged victims
According to a newspaper, the dead people over 60 and 70 years accounted for 65% and
45%, respectively, of the 2,854 victims in five prefectures. There are 35% and 21% in these
age-groups in Iwate Prefecture,. Thus the victims’ rates are twice as large. This clearly
indicates a disproportionately high death rate for aged people. In the case of the 1995 Great
Kobe Earthquake, people over 70 years accounted for 40% of the deaths in Hyogo
Prefecture. Higher mortality rates for aged people have been recognized as an important
issue in the past, and was the same for the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. One
reason is that people in hospitals and nursing-care facilities need a longer time for
evacuation. Single people and aged people who need nursing-care are also less able to make
a quick evacuation. Therefore, we need to develop evacuation measures that are effective
for Japan’s aged society.
4.4 Recovery and reconstruction
There are different challenges recovering from tsunami damages compared to those from
earthquakes. The first challenge is the interruption to transportation in the coastal areas.
Ports , railways and roads could not be used due to heavy damage. Some places could be
accessed only by helicopter. In fact, air transportation was the only way to bring water, food
and other life necessities to islands for 2 weeks.
Some municipalities lost city/town halls, and could not provide help and services to
people. The most tragic town is Otsuchi where many officers were killed by the tsunami. It
could not establish even the disaster countermeasures office. Other municipalities sent their
officers to help them from a week later. As the officers themselves were victims of disasters
to a greater or lesser degree, it is very hard to establish a headquarter office to help refugees
and affected people. Many NPOs and local people worked to help them.
Another problem is safety management of rescue activities for aftershocks and possible
further tsunamis. Data transmission stopped from many tsunami monitoring stations off the
Pacific coast operated by JMA. For example, tsunami measurement station at Soma,
Fukushima Prefecture, ceased data transmission after sending increasing water surface to
7.3 m at 3:50PM on March 11. Nine of ten tidal stations could not send their data after the
first or second tsunami wave, or immediately after the earthquake. By then the region had
lost its tsunami monitoring capability for a certain period of time.
Ground subsidence has increased the risk of inundation in a wide area along the
Pacific coast. As mentioned in Section 2.2, subsidence ranges from 0.4 to 1.2 m. Sea
water piling up in the inundated area did not return to the sea naturally, and it was a
large obstacle for investigation of missing people and for rescue activities. Although
local authorities introduced many pumper trucks, drainage of sea water takes time
because the inundated areas are very expansive. As a result of ground subsidence and
collapse of seawalls after the earthquake, parts of the coastal areas were inundated by
regular tidal motion during spring tide,. The Pacific coast of the northeast Japan faces a
huge problem of how to reconstruct the protection system against high tide, waves,
storm surges and tsunamis.
Disaster wreckage is another big problem. The earthquake and tsunami generated 25
million tons of wreckage in only the three prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima. It is
not possible to take the wreckage to outer areas. Stock piling a mixture of wreckages may
cause contamination of soils, sandy beaches, and surface and ground waters. Therefore,
disasters and their recovery are closely connected to environmental problems. Disaster
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management plans focus on the refugees etc., but seldom consider the treatment of the
wreckage. There is a need to incorporate this issue in disaster management plans.
5 Tsunami and the accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant No.1
The most serious consequence of the tsunami is the accident of Fukushima NPP No.1.
Construction of the first nuclear reactor in Fukushima started in 1967, and six reactors were
built over a period of about 10 years. Table 2 shows the year construction started and the
generation capacity of each reactor. The generation capacity of the Fukushima No.1 was
4,696 MW in total, which amounts to 6% of the gross supply capacity of the TEPCO.
Fukushima NPP No.2 is located 10 km south of Fukushima No.1. These two NPPs are all
situated on the coast, with their own ports for transportation of nuclear fuels and cooling
water uptake. The Fukushima coast, therefore, is Japan’s big electricity supply base. The
giant tsunami hit it, inducing the severe accident and raising serious concerns in Japan and,
furthermore, around the world.
The events after the accident occurred are as follows, according to Disaster Countermeasures
Office (2011b), Office of Prime Minister.
2:46PM, 11th March, the great earthquake occurred. Nuclear reactors 1 to 3 made
emergency shut-downs successfully, while the other reactors 4 to 6 were not operating
because of regular inspection. As the electric feeder lines to Fukushima NPP No.1 were
damaged by the earthquake, emergency generators started to power the emergency cooling
system. However, the first wave of the tsunami arrived at 3:27PM, and the second wave at
3:35PM, inundating the buildings housing the nuclear reactors and generators with water 4
to 5 m deep. As a consequence, the emergency generators stopped, and reactors 1 to 5 lost
electricity for cooling systems.
After 12th March, cooling water levels were lowered in reactors 1 to 3, resulting in damage
and partial melting of nuclear fuel rods. To protect the nuclear reactors, pressure was lowered by
releasing water vapor out of the reactors. This diffused radioactive matter into the atmosphere.
At the same time, as used nuclear fuel rods were stored in pools in the buildings, there was also
a need to cool the pools continuously. As of the end of April, 2011, though the situation is
becoming stable, unprecedented long-term efforts are necessary to stabilize the rectors.
Obviously, the tsunami triggered the accident. TEPCO (2011) recently reported that the
tsunami run-up elevation was 14 to 15 m, whereas the height of the design tsunami was
5.7 m. The ground elevation of the Fukushima NPP No.1 is about 10 m, and the emergency
cooling pumps were set in the basements of the buildings. Therefore, the reactors lost the
cooling system due to tsunami flooding.
Table 2 Basic Information of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant No.1
Power unit Capacity (MW) Construction start Condition at the earthquake break
Unit 1 460 Sep. 1967 Operation
Unit 2 784 May 1969 Operation
Unit 3 784 Oct. 1970 Operation
Unit 4 784 Sep. 1972 Regular inspection
Unit 5 784 Dec. 1971 Regular inspection
Unit 6 1100 May 1973 Regular inspection
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There are other nuclear power plants located on the Pacific coast, such as Onagawa
(Miyagi), Fukushima No.2, and Tokai No.2 (Ibaraki). These were also affected by the
tsunami, but no critical accident occurred. This is mainly because in each case the elevation
of the ground were high enough compared with the tsunami’s run-up. For example, in
Fukushima No.2, the run-up height was 6.5 to 7 m, higher than the design height of 5.2 m.
However, the major buildings were situated on ground which is 12 m high. The damage
from the tsunami was not large (TEPCO, 2011). Significantly, the Onagawa NPP of the
Tohoku Electric Power Co. was hit by a 13 m tsunami, but, as the ground level was 13.8 m,
it only suffered from a small inundation (Tohoku Power Co. 2011).
As already mentioned, the Pacific coast of the northeast Japan has a history of
damage caused by big tsunamis such as Meiji Sanriku Tsunami in 1896, Showa
Sanriku Tsunami in 1933 and Chilean Earthquake Tsunami in 1960. Moreover, recent
research has found evidence that a giant tsunami called the Jyogan Earthquake
Tsunami occurred in 869 (Minoura and Nakaya, 1991). It is estimated that the
earthquake’s magnitude was about M8, and that the tsunami penetrated 2 to 4 km inland
(Sugawara et al. 2001; Satake et al. 2008). Similar wide inundation areas might have
happened 1200 years ago. Considering that accumulation of stresses between the Pacific
and the North American plates generates big earthquakes periodically, such big
earthquakes and tsunami can occur every several hundreds to a thousand years. Based
on such findings, the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion plans to
investigate the big earthquakes and tsunamis off the Pacific coasts. Unfortunately, such
a major event happened before such scientific findings could be incorporated into
practical policies, plans and actions.
6 Conclusions
Characteristics and damages vary between disasters. The most significant feature of the
Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami is in its complexity. We should regard it as not a
simple composite disaster but a giant composite disaster. The combination of an earthquake
of M9.0 and a giant tsunami was unprecedented in Japan’s recent history. Furthermore, the
combination of these natural events and the nuclear accident makes this a disaster with
serious and widespread damage.
Japan, and northeast Japan in particular, have for a long time been increasing the
preparedness against earthquakes and tsunamis. Despite this, huge damage occurred. This
indicates that the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami was beyond past experiences
and our expectation. This event suggests that we should not only implement disaster
prevention based on improved scientific understanding, but also take into account the
possibility of maximum potential hazards.
For the reconstruction of the heavily impacted areas, should people continue to live in
the same areas in the future? This is an important question. Given the potential high risk
levels in these areas, we need to examine the strategy for disaster prevention and recovery.
In order to save lives in the face of a 1/1000 year tsunami, there are no ways other than
quick evacuation and rescue. We should remember this concept clearly. At the same time,
we can protect human lives and socioeconomic activities against more frequent and lower
magnitude tsunamis by using a combination of hard and soft measures. An idea emerging in
the discussion for reconstruction of the northeast Japan is division of living and working
places. People should live in higher places, while they work on the coastal areas because
low-lying coastal areas are still effective and important for ports, fishery ports and
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commercial activities. Therefore, coastal dykes, coastal forests and other facilities should be
reconstructed so that they can protect the economically important coastal areas against
using design criteria such as 1/200 or more frequent events. Although discussions are
only starting, we need to reestablish flexible and disaster prevention systems with
multilayered targets.
At the same time, Japan’s society also should address the other problems which
were recognized as sustainability issues for a long time before the earthquake and
tsunami. They are how to address the aging society, climate change and nature
friendly society in an integrated manner. The reconstruction is not merely the
reconstruction of the former local societies. We should create new societies which are
safer, more environmentally friendly and more vital. This is a real challenge for
Japanese society.
The historical event and the resulting damage shocked all social sectors, including
the research community. Recent findings of scientific research were not transferred to
the improvement of the protection of nuclear power plants and other important
facilities. This is a problem for the decision-making system of society. We realize that
there were barriers among different fields to hamper information flows between
disciplines. Single academic fields cannot resolve a real world problem. Rather,
multi-disciplinary approaches are necessary to meet the challenges facing society.
This has been recognized for a relatively long time, but we need to realize the
importance of this notion and develop new mechanisms to promote multi-disciplinary
cooperation. This is how academic society can contribute to the reconstruction of the
Japanese society.
Immediately after the earthquake and tsunami occurred we received numerous
emails, telephone calls and letters from friends in many countries. These are most
encouraging to us. In addition, Dr Robert Dixon, Editor of Mitigation and Adaptation
Strategies for Global Change, kindly offered an opportunity to present a timely report.
We appreciate Prof. John Hay for his careful proof reading and correction of English of
the draft. We hope that this paper assists many people to understand the situation that is
ongoing in Japan.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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